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COMMENTS
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
What is the standard of care required of a physician? Properly
stated, it is ordinary care. It would seem elementary that the person who
undertakes to treat human illnesses must exercise the care and skill of
the ordinary practitioner under similar circumstances.' In ascertaining
exactly what those similar circumstances are, the training of the doctor
and the locality in which he practices are factors limiting the standard of
care expected. These factors limit the liability of the defendant doctor;
unless there is evidence that his conduct fell below that which could be
expected of the average reasonable practitioner of the same school of
treatment in the same locality as the defendant. These are commonly
known as the school and locality rules. A question still remains as to
whether these limitations are grounded in reason and ought to be re-
tained, or whether they are simply relics of the past, and ought to be
disregarded. Two recent decisions of the Florida appellate courts have
redefined these areas."
The resolution of the question of whether a given act amounts to
negligence on the 'art of a physician is not usually open to observation
by jurors of common ordinary experience. Therefore, expert 2 testimony
is needed to establish that negligence.8 The school and locality rules have
made it difficult for the plaintiff to present expert evidence that is
qualified within those limitations.4 Occasionally courts permit circum-
1. Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.2d 658
(Fla. 1954) ; Hill v. Boughton, 146 Fla. 505, 1 So.2d 610 (1941) ; Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137
Fla. 826, 188 So. 815 (1939) ; Foster v. Thornton, 113 Fla. 600, 152 So. 667 (1933) ; Bir v.
Foster, 123 So.2d 279 (Fla. App. 1960) ; Brown v. Swindal, 121 So.2d 38 (Fla. App. 1960) ;
Atkins v. Humes, 107 So.2d 253 (Fla. App. 1958); Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 307
(Fla. App. 1958). See also, Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897); McNevins
v. Lowe, 40 Ill. 209 (1866); Bacon v. Walsh, 184 Ill. App. 377 (1913) ; Edwards v. UIand,
193 Ind. 376, 140 N.E. 546 (1923) ; Clark v. George, 148 Minn. 52, 180 N.W. 1011 (1921);
PROSSER, TORTS 133 (2d ed. 1955) (cases cited n.87).
la. Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So.2d 312 (Fla. App. 1962); Musachia v. Terry, 140 So.2d
605 (Fla. App. 1962).
2. FLA. STAT. § 90.23 (1961).
3. Atkins v. Humes, 110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959); PRossER, TORTS 134 (2d ed. 1955)
(cases cited n.97).
4. Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951) (judicial notice that
members of the local medical society are loath to testify against each other).
One plaintiff grew so discouraged at the unanimous refusal of physicians to testify
that she unsuccessfully brought suit against the county medical society, alleging a con-
spiracy. Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118 (Cal. App. 1959), noted in 58 MIcH. L. REV. 802
(1960).
Wisconsin has a statute which waives the effect of the locality rule in situations when
a plaintiff is unable to secure expert evidence: "[A] medical or osteopathic physician,
licensed to practice in another state, may testify as the attending or examining physician or
surgeon to the care, treatment, examination or condition of sick or injured persons whom he
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At the time the school rule was first formulated, some seventy years
ago,' it was thought it would be unfair to require from a practitioner of
a recognized9 school of medical thought the same type of treatment 10 as a
practitioner of a different school would have rendered in the same circum-
stances." To do so would be for the law to make a choice between the
has treated in the ordinary course of his professional practice for the sickness or injury
which is the subject of the judicial inquiry in any action or proceeding in which he is
called as a witness." Wis. STAT. § 147.14(2a) (1961). A previous version of this statute
was construed in Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935).
5. "[N]egligence in a case like this might be inferred from circumstances proven, but
. . . when circumstantial evidence is relied on . . . the circumstances should raise a fair
presumption of negligence." Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 703, 170 So. 459, 461 (1936).
See also Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Walker Hospital v. Pulley, 74
Ind. App. 659, 127 N.E. 559 (1920) (leaving several yards of gauze imbedded in the wound).
6. Despite reluctance to permit the use of texts, due to the rule against hearsay, there
is early case authority supporting their use. Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene 441 (Iowa 1848).
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79C (1959) provides: "A statement of fact or opinion on a
subject of science or art contained in a published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet
shall, in the discretion of the court, and if the court finds that it is relevant and that the
writer of such statement is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on the subject,
be admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake against physi-
cians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals and sanitaria, as evidence tending to prove
said fact or as opinion evidence; provided, however, that the party intending to offer as
evidence any such statement shall, not less than three days before the trial of the action,
give the adverse party notice of such intention, stating the name of the writer of the
statement and the title of the treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet in which it is contained."
(Emphasis added.)
7. "[T]he witness must qualify as having expert knowledge of the correct and proper
manner and method of administering the particular treatment . . . ." Foster v. Thornton,
125 Fla. 699, 706, 170 So. 459, 462 (1936); Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322, 79 S.W. 655
(1904). "[T]hose who are qualified by training and experience to perform similar services
in the community." Brown v. Swindal, 121 So.2d 38, 40 (Fla. App. 1960). See generally, 12
U. FLA. L. REV. 121 (1959).
8. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 Atl. 1116 (1893).
9. A practitioner of an unrecognized school, i.e., a witch-doctor, would not be entitled
to the exclusionary protection of the school rule, and simply would be held liable for the
standard of care of the ordinary physician. The school must be based upon some scientific
principles, and not on arbitrary cultisms. Specific repudiations include: Nelson v. Harrington,
72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 (1888) (spiritualist or clairvoyant physician) ; Longan v. Weltmer,
180 Mo. 322, 79 S.W. 655 (1904) (magnetic healing); Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187
Pac. 282 (1920) (Chinese herb doctor). Schools commonly recognized include allopathic,
homeopathic, eclectic, osteopathic, chiropractic, Christian Science and drugless healing
(naturopathy).
10. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 At. 1116 (1893); Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene
441 (Iowa 1848); Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am. Dec. 593 (1862); Bryant v. Biggs,
331 Mich. 64, 49 N.W.2d 63 (1951); Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159
(1925); Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905); Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb.
769, 238 N.W. 529 (1931); Porter v. Puryear, 153 Tex. 82, 262 S.W.2d 933 (1953), rev'd
and remanded, 153 Tex. 82, 264 S.W. 689 (1954); Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219
S.W.2d 779 (1949); PROSSER, TORTS 133 (2d ed. 1955) (cases cited n.90); Annot., 78
A.L.R. 696 (1931).
11. "[I]t was incumbent on him to use reasonable care and skill to ascertain whether
the ailments were of the class to which his treatment applied. If not, it was his duty to so
advise plaintiff, in order that she might secure the services of one familiar with such
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schools, preferring some one single school as the only true school, when
the very fact that there are different schools indicates that the minds of
reasonable experts differ as to what theories or treatments are proper in
identical cases. 2 Thus, the standard of care required of a physician came
to be stated as: the customary and usual practice of the ordinarily careful
and skilled practitioner of the same school in the community."l
In the recent case of Musachia v. Terry, 4 the defendant doctor of
osteopathy objected to the evidence of plaintiff's expert doctor of medicine
on the issue of his standard of care.'" The trial court sustained this
objection, excluded the doctor's evidence, and directed a verdict for the
defendant. In reviewing this decision, the appellate court did not reject
the school rule out of hand, but rather avoided it, by finding that the facts
of the case fell within an exception to the rule. This well recognized
exception to the school rule is applicable to those areas of practice where
the principles of the schools do, or should concur. 6 This view paves the
way for the application of an objective standard, to see if any school
can be permitted to remain ignorant of advances discovered by another
school. A major area where the principles of the schools ought to
ailments." Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 192, 205 N.W. 159, 162 (1925); accord,
Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459 (1936). But a practitioner of an unrecognized
school is not entitled to the protection of the school rule. Annot., 78 A.L.R. 696 (1931).
12. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 Atl. 1116 (1893).
13. Cases collected in Annot., 78 A.L.R. 696 (1931). But cf. Bacon v. Walsh, 184 Ill.
App. 377 (1913). In Illinois, all physicians are licensed by the State "to practice medicine
and surgery, and there is no distinction made between different schools of medicine ....
The insertion of the words 'and of the school of which defendant belongs' is erroneous and
misleading. It limits the care and skill which he must use, not to the average ordinary care
and skill of the physicians and surgeons in good practice in the vicinity, . . . but to the
care and skill of some particular sect of physicians and surgeons in that locality." Id. at
379, 380.
14. 140 So.2d 605 (Fla. App. 1962).
15. The defendant was called to treat plaintiff's decedent, who had just been severely
beaten. After several days in the hospital, the patient was told that he was suffering from
nothing more serious than an adynamic ileus, which is a digestive disorder, involving a
paralysis of the ileus, or small intestine. Further hospitalization was suggested by the
defendant, but in view of the diagnosis made, the patient demanded to be discharged.
Upon his release, the patient died the following day. The post-mortem examination
disclosed that the immediate cause of death was perforations of the intestine, leading to
fecal peritonitis. Decedent had thirteen fractured ribs and generalized peritonitis, in
addition to the adynamic ileus. At the trial for wrongful death, under FLA. STAT. § 768
(1961) the plaintiff tendered the evidence of a doctor of medicine on the issue that the
defendant was negligent in his diagnosis and treatment of the decedent. The trial court
excluded this testimony, on the ground that the witness was of a different school than
the defendants, and therefore his evidence as to the standard of care required, and hence
their negligence, was inadmissible.
16. "Further, the rule as contended for, like all others, has its exceptions. It does
not exclude the testimony of physicians of other schools or experts in other lines when
that testimony bears on a point as to which the principles of the schools do or should
concur, such as the dangers incident to the use of X-rays or the existence of a condition
that should be recognized by any physician." Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 707, 170 So.
459, 463 (1936).
17. A physician is not only held to his school's practice, but he is also charged with
the "duty of keeping pace with the progress of professional knowledge, ideas, and dis-
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concur lies in the field of diagnosis. The rationale is that there is actually
only one disease, and even if the various schools would treat that disorder
differently, they all ought to recognize its existence.'" Similarly, when a
situation involves the use of mechanical devices such as X-ray or
diathermy machines 9 or the administration of common anesthetics, °
then the principles of the schools are deemed by law to concur, and hence
expert testimony from practitioners of the other schools will be admitted.
It is easily seen that the area where "the principles of the schools do or
should concur . . . 112 opens a vast exception to the school rule, and raises
the question as to whether there is any longer a valid distinction between
any of the schools of treatment of human illnesses, and more particularly
the schools of medicine and osteopathy. Do significant differences in the
practices of these two schools still obtain?
In 1897, when the principles of osteopathy were laid down by Dr.
A. T. Still, a Missouri doctor of medicine, the science of medicine was
still partially in its dark ages.22 It had just felt the impact of the
revolutionary ideas of Jenner, Pasteur, Koch and Lister, on the theory of
disease. The systems of the body were imperfectly understood. No one
school had a monopoly on scientific truth.23 Dr. Still conceived the theory
that physical misplacements or dislocations of portions of the musculo-
skeletal system would impinge upon blood vessels or nerves, impeding the
flow of blood or "vital energy" through them, and resulting in manifesta-
tions of disorder at their termini. He called this the "osteopathic lesion,"
and prescribed manipulative therapy to reduce the impingement. It may
well be that due to the relative ignorance of the time, this theory was seized
upon improperly as a cure-all, and was mistakenly applied to situations
where it could not possibly effect relief. However, there were areas in
which osteopathic treatment was effective,24 and where orthodox medicine
had provided no relief. Lack of communication between the schools, and
the abhorrence of the term "osteopathic lesion," in addition to political
coveries, to the extent that a faithful, conscientious, and competent practitioner, of
whatever school, may be reasonably expected . . . to do . . . ." Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn.
167, 171, 27 Atl. 1116, 1117 (1893).
18. Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905); Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb.
769, 238 N.W. 529 (1931).
19. "Where the subject of inquiry relates to the manner of use of electrical or
mechanical appliances in common use in all fields of practice." Porter v. Puryear, 153 Tex.
82, 262 S.W.2d 933, 936 (1953), rev'd and remanded, 153 Tex. 82, 264 S.W. 689 (1954);
Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905).
20. Porter v. Puryear, supra note 19; Annot., 78 A.L.R. 696 (1931).
21. Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 707, 170 So. 459, 463 (1936) quoted in Musachia
v. Terry, 140 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla. App. 1962).
22. Leeches used to treat glaucoma. Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1897).
23. The "eclectic" school was organized to follow no single method, but instead to
choose the best from the various other schools and to reject the rest as incorrect. Eclectic
practitioners were recognized by membership on the Florida Board of Medical Examiners
prior to 1941, when this recognition was abolished by Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20927.
24. HORLER, I AccuSE THE DOCTORS (1941).
1962]
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problems within the American Medical Association, led to little attention
or scientific analysis being directed by organized medicine towards the
elements of value in osteopathic theory. More recently, organized medi-
cine has begun to adopt many of the valuable principles of osteopathy,
organizing them within a new specialty called "physical medicine"
wherein many of the same manipulative techniques practiced by osteo-
paths are used on the musculo-skeletal system. Contemporaneously,
osteopathy has turned from its original rejection of surgery and drugs,
towards a wholehearted embrace of all the modern concepts of medicine.
Curricula currently taught in the five schools of osteopathy", exactly
duplicates that taught in approved schools of orthodox medicine. The
only distinguishing feature is that additional courses devoted to oste-
opathic manipulative theory and treatment are taught in the schools of
osteopathy. Early emphasis on manipulation is being decreased.26
A committee of the AMA recently completed a study in depth of the
schools of osteopathy, with a view towards ending all distinctions.2
A recent amendment to the Medical Officer Procurement Act of 194728
25. Chicago; Des Moines, Iowa; Kansas City, Missouri; Kirksville, Missouri;
Philadelphia. The California College of Osteopathy in Los Angeles, recently changed, to
become a school of medicine. See n.32 infra.
26. See D. 0., July 1962, at 38.
27. 158 A.M.A.J. 736 (July 1955). A five man committee of the AMA, assisted by
five deans of schools of medicine, made the inspection and investigation. The committee
covered the (then) five schools of osteopathy; the Philadelphia school was not examined.
Its findings, in general, were that the sole fundamental difference lies in the degree of
emphasis placed upon the study of the musculo-skeletal system and in the use of manipulative
therapy that is taught in the osteopathic schools. The emphasis on manipulative therapy
is decreasing in osteopathic schools, and is increasing in the orthodox schools. The courses
involving the study of the musculo-skeletal systems and manipulation are in addition to all
other medical topics taught in schools of osteopathy, and do not interfere with, nor are
they incompatible with them.
As to the use of the term "osteopathic lesion," which has been an issue between
the schools, the committee said: "Osteopathy teaches that the symptom complex of
musculoskeletal lesion exists. Its exact nature is not known. It may be relieved by manipula-
tive therapy, -but the mechanism of relief is not understood. The lesion has not been
demonstrated to cause organic disease, and its correction alone does not cure organic
disease." Id. at 740.
It further commented that if the lesion is not accompanied by manifestation of disease,
then it may be treated by manipulation. If disease is indicated, then the osteopathic
practice would be treatment by medication, surgery and other etiological or pathological
methods, in accord with common medical practice. X-ray is used freely as a diagnostic
tool as it is in medical practice. The committee's conclusions were:
(1) Educational requirements for admission to schools of osteopathy are the same as
for schools of medicine.
(2) The full basic science and clinical curriculum found in schools of medicine is
taught in schools of osteopathy.
(3) The faint aura of cultism which clings to osteopathic teaching arises out of
the past. It does not result from the present beliefs, teachings and practices of the vast
majority of faculty members of colleges of osteopathy. "The teaching in present-day
colleges of osteopathy does not constitute the teachings of cultist healing." Id. at 741.
This report failed of passage, by a vote of 101 to 81, when presented to the AMA.




led to a thorough hearing as to the advisability of appointing osteopaths
as medical officers in the armed forces. Despite opposition of the AMA2"
the amendments were approved, abolishing all distinctions between the
schools, for purposes of appointment to and service in the armed forces.
The California Osteopathic Society recently voted to merge with
the California Medical Association and eliminate all distinctions between
the schools of osteopathy and medicine. The first step was the accredita-
tion by the AMA of the California College of Osteopathy, ° now renamed
the Los Angeles College of Medicine. This school has recently been
awarding M.D. degrees to almost all of the 2742 practicing doctors of
osteopathy. 1 Hereafter all osteopaths will continue to practice, but now
as doctors of medicine under the same regulations as other doctors of
medicine. In November 1962 the voters of California approved a
constitutional amendment abolishing the special licensing of osteopaths. 2
Illinois has recently taken the position that the qualifications of a
graduate of the Chicago College of Osteopathy do not differ from those
of graduates of recognized colleges of medicine, and its supreme court
has required that doctors of osteopathy be permitted to take the exami-
29. Dr. James R. McVay, a trustee of the AMA, testified that in his opinion the
standards of osteopathy are as yet inferior to medicine, and therefore doctors of
osteopathy in the armed services would render inferior medical care to the troops.
There was other testimony, by the surgeon general, expressing the fear that if the
proposed amendment were passed, and osteopaths were appointed, then their practice in
service hospitals would constitute the practice of cultist medicine in those hospitals, and
result in withdrawal of their AMA accreditation. If such accreditation were withdrawn,
then no intern could use the time spent in these hospitals in fulfillment of his internship
requirements. It was argued that this might jeopardize the internship training program
whereby the services attract new medical graduates to enter the services immediately and
complete their internship requirements by service in military hospitals. It was said that
problems might arise when osteopaths are promoted to positions where they may exercise
command functions over doctors of medicine. Hearings on H.R. 483 Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. REP. No.
1140, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1956); S. REP. No. 1869, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956);
H.R. REP. No. 2702, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (conference report).
30. Accredited by AMA Council on Medical Education and Hospitals, and by
Association of American Medical Colleges, effective Feb. 15, 1962. It had been founded
as a school of osteopathy in 1914.
31. California's $65 Trade: M.D. for D.O. Degree. D.O., June 1962 at 30.
32. Proposition No. 22, a proposed amendment to the California Constitution was
approved in the November 1962 general election, 3,200,000 for, and 1,400,000 against.
This abolition of separate licenses was violently opposed by the American Osteopathic
Association, which fears a loss of identity and of the philosophical backgrounds of
osteopathy. The Association had raised a $250,000 "war chest," by special assessment- of
its membership, to fight this and other potential abolitions. D.O., April 1962, p. 10
(Editorial by C. L. Naylor, President of the American Osteopathic Association).
Recent feelers have been put out by organized medicine in Pennsylvania. The AMA
NEws for October 29, 1962, carried the following note:
The Pennsylvania Medical Society's House of Delegates voted to establish a
procedure whereby qualified osteopaths in the state may become members of the
society. PMS proposes that the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy apply for
accreditation as a medical college and seek authorization to confer medical
degrees to its current students, as well as to osteopaths who are fully licensed in
the state and whom the college deems properly qualified.
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nation for the Illinois license to practice medicine, instead of the pre-
viously restricted license to practice only osteopathy.3
In Florida, separate licenses to practice medicine and osteopathy
are granted to graduates of the different schools. These are administered
by different regulatory boards,"' but it is implied that the standard of
excellence, training and skill demanded of graduates of either school is
the same.3 5
In the Musachia case, the court used two major exceptions to the
school rule. It found that the negligence involved pertained to diagnosis,"6
where concurrence is presumed, and also found it error for the trial
court to exclude the testimony of the plaintiff's medical doctor witness as
to the propriety of the treatment rendered, without first ascertaining
whether the principles of the schools do concur as to such treatment.
The exceptions to the school rule involving diagnosis, concurrent
thought, machines, anesthetics, have all but engulfed it. There is ap-
parently no longer any valid difference between practices in the schools
of osteopathy and medicine.37 Thus, it seems that the need for the exclu-
sionary school rule between these two schools is obsolete. As to other
33. Chicago College of Osteopathy v. Puffer, 51 Ill. 2d 441, 126 N.E.2d 26 (1955).
34. FLA. STAT. § 458 (Physicians), § 459 (Osteopaths) (1961).
35. Florida Statutes previously provided the following examination topics for the
















FLA. STAT. § 458.09 (1959), amended to
eliminate specific examination topics, Fla.
















Practice of Osteopathic Medicine
Toxicology
FLA. STAT. § 459.09 (1955), amended to
eliminate specific *examination topics, Fla.
Laws 1957, ch. 57-241.
36. Grainger v. Still, 187 Me. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905).
37. There are still significant differences among other recognized schools for treating
human illnesses, such as Christian Science, naturopathy, and chiropractic. As to osteopathy,
ten states permit doctors of osteopathy to hold their license as physicians, including Illinois
and New York. Approximately twenty five other states, including Florida, permit practi-
tioners of osteopathy to practice under special licensing statutes. See also Welch v. Shaver,
351 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) ; see note 27 supra.
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schools, like chiropractic, it would seem that protection of the public 8
would require that the practitioner be held responsible for the best pos-
sible standard of medical treatment and care, and ought not be permitted
to hide behind the exclusionary effect of the school rule.
THE LOCALITY RULE
The rule restricting the standard of care of the doctor to that preva-
lent in the locality, was a logical outgrowth of the poor communications
that existed in the early days of the country. 9 Doctors outside of large
centers remained relatively unaware of medical advances. In addition
to the initial handicap of minimal training, the average physician out-
side of metropolitan areas labored under large case loads. Initially, the
courts refused to hold the defendant to the standard of care of the
average practitioner in the country, but instead limited the standard to
that of the average or ordinarily skilled practitioner in the same local-
ity.4" The intent of this rule, sound at the time, was not to require of a
backwoods practitioner the same standard of care as would be expected
of a city doctor, who had at hand all the facilities for both treatment and
learning of the metropolitan hospital.
This is the essence of the strict locality rule. Its inherent weakness
is demonstrable by assuming that there is but one physician in that
locality, and that physician is the defendant.4 ' How then can a plaintiff
secure an expert to establish the standard of care required of the de-
fendant? In the face of so obvious an anomaly, the courts liberalized
this very strict use of the locality rule, taking the position that the
standard required of the physician is that of the ordinary practitioner in
the same or similar localities.42 This position relieved the impossibility
of securing expert testimony in a case against the single practitioner in
a small isolated community, but it developed a morass of interpretation
problems as to just what a similar locality is. The intent doubtless was
to require similarity concerning medical standards and practices. A
minority took the view that geographical contiguity was at least part of
38. Bacon v. Walsh, 184 Ill. App. 377 (1913). The practice of chiropractic healing,
which seems to the author to occupy much the same position today as did osteopathy
sixty years ago, is specifically regulated. FLA. STAT. § 460 (1961).
39. Couch v. Hutchison, 135 So.2d 18 (Fla. App. 1961). See generally Annot., 8
A.L.R.2d 772 (1949).
40. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 AtI. 1116 (1893).
41. Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877); Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 69 S.W. 1096
(1902); Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880).
42. Hill v. Boughton, 146 Fla. 505, 1 So.2d 610 (1941); accord, Weintraub v. Rosen,
93 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1937); Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949); Gist v.
French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955); Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So.2d
575 (Fla. 1957); Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Baldor v. Rogers, 81
So.2d 658 (Fla. 1954); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950);
Norton v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 144 So.2d 249 (La. App. 1962); Lockart v. Maclean, 361
P.2d 670 (Nev. 1961); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 121 A.2d 669 (R. I. 1956); Morrill v.
Komasinski, 256 Wis. 417,41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the test of similarity.4" The plaintiff's expert had to show that his practice
was nearby to that of the defendant, and also in a town of the same size.
This view avoided the situation of a plaintiff calling his expert witness
from a small town in Maine, to testify as to the standard of care that
might be expected of defendant, who is a practitioner in a town of the
same size in Nevada." It failed to establish limits short of that absurdity.
Typical interpretation problems that have arisen relate to whether
Chicago is similar to Davenport, Iowa,45 or Grand Rapids, Michigan,46
and the attempt to compare Los Angeles with San Luis Obispo, Cali-
fornia, 47 and Philadelphia with Providence, Rhode Island.4" The inter-
pretations have not been overly liberal, and a court has held that
Rochester, New Hampshire, is dissimilar to Boston.49
In analyzing the similarity referred to, it becomes apparent that the
court is simply requiring a foundation for testimony from the plaintiff's
expert as to the standard of care that would be employed in essentially
similar circumstances. He must be familiar with the medical practices in
the locality in which the defendant practiced before he can testify as to
the standard of care expected of the defendant. This familiarity or
foundation can be shown in several ways. The witness may have come
from the same locality,5' or from localities with equivalent facilities.5
He may have trained at the same school as the defendant,52 or he may
show that even though he does not practice in that community, he has
knowledge5" of the practices employed there. In extreme cases, the
witness may testify that the practices of the defendant would be unac-
ceptable in any community.54 It should be noted that the emphasis of
the rule is essentially exclusionary.
Florida courts have approved the locality rule in dicta.55 In one
43. Warnock v. Kraft, 30 Cal. App. 2d 1, 85 P.2d 505 (1938).
44. Although today this could probably be done, provided that there was a showing
that the standards, training, facilities and practices in both towns were the same.
45. McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950).
46. Sampson v. Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931).
47. Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955).
48. Cavallaro v. Sharp, 121 A.2d 669 (R.I. 1956).
49. Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941).
50. Musachia v. Terry, 140 So.2d 605 (Fla. App. 1962).
51. Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So.2d 312 (Fla. App. 1962). See notes 45-48 supra.
52. Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955).
53. Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951); Ardoline v. Keegan,
140 Conn. 552, 102 A.2d 352 (1954); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680
(1953); Morrill v. Komasinski, 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
54. Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So.2d
312 (Fla. App. 1962) ; Lockart v. Maclean, 361 P.2d 670 (Nev. 1961).
55. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 90 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Montgomery v. Stary,
84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1954); Hill v. Boughton,
146 Fla. 505, 1 So.2d 610 (1941); Olschefsky v. Fischer, 123 So.2d 751 (Fla. App. 1960);




case5" the Florida Supreme Court criticized the exclusionary effect of the
locality rule. Its criticism did not extend to a repudiation of the locality
rule. The court avoided the question by permitting the evidence of
plaintiff's witnesses, who were not of the same locality, on the view that
the conduct of the defendant would be unacceptable in any community. 7
In a subsequent case where the issue on appeal was the standard of care,
the court indicated approval of the liberal locality rule5" but again it
was not directly in issue, as the conduct of the defendant was found to
have been negligent when tested by the evidence of the standards pre-
vailing within the same:community. A ruling almost on point occurred in
the 1961 case of Couch v. Hutchison,59 in which an interesting interplay
of both the school and locality rules was involved. The defendant, an
osteopath in St. Petersburg, sought to establish his proper treatment of
the plaintiff. The defendant tendered supporting evidence of other osteo-
paths, trained in the same school as the defendant, who practiced in
Philadelphia. The plaintiff tendered evidence of medical doctors who
practiced in St. Petersburg. In this case it was the defendant who sought
to use the testimony of a physician outside the immediate locality in
order to establish his own reasonable care. Strangely enough, the de-
fendant was the only osteopathic orthopedic surgeon practicing on the
west coast of Florida. The exclusionary effect of the locality rule would
have been fatal to his case. The court held that the primary considera-
tion must be to test the conduct of the defendant doctor by the stand-
ards of his own school.60 If there is no way to establish those standards
by evidence of the theories and practices of members of that school in
the same locality, then it is proper to establish the standards of that
school from without the locality.0 ' This case would seem to have set the
locality rule to rest in Florida. In addition to the holding, which clearly
disregarded the locality rule in that posture, the case contained a host
of critical dicta suggesting limitations on or total discard of the locality
rule. 2 The court summed up: "The rule has, of course, an appropriate
56. Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
57. "The jury could have found, as a matter of their own common knowledge and
experience, and independent of expert testimony as to acceptable medical practice, that the
fingers and thumb of a premature infant were needlessly burned off and that this could not
be considered acceptable medical practice in any community." Id. at 40.
58. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1957) (same or similar com-
munities or localities).
59. 135 So.2d 18 (Fla. App. 1961).
60. Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459 (1936); see generally cases collected
in Annot., 78 A.L.R. 696 (1931).
61. The case took a different posture from usual school rule cases on appeal. Usually,
if all the evidence that the plaintiff has is from an expert of another school than the
defendant, the trial court will exclude such evidence and direct a verdict for the defendant.
In the Couch case, the trial court permitted the non-school evidence of the plaintiff to
make a prima facie case for the plaintiff. It then refused to admit the non-local evidence
for the defendant. This resulted in the appealed-from verdict for the plaintiff.
62. "It takes a strange sense of logic to hold that local practice rules out all other
evidence on the central issue of reasonable care on such a widely pervasive subject."
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relation to the admissibility of evidence; but persuasive argument can
be made for not regarding the locality rule as a rule absolute describing
the definitive means of measuring reasonable care in cases of alleged
malpractice . *. .. "', Due to the posture, which involved the school rule
as well, the case did not squarely reject the locality rule, but it restricted
the use of the rule as merely one circumstance relative to the reasonable
care of the defendant.
Apparently the abusive potential of the locality rule has not been
laid to rest, for in the recent case of Cook v. Lichtblau,"4 the defendant
was able to convince the trial judge that the evidence of the plaintiff's
Miami expert was inadmissible under the exclusionary locality rule on
the issue of the standard of care required of the defendant, a practi-
tioner 5 in West Palm Beach. The trial court apparently took the view
that under the locality rule, it is the burden of the plaintiff66 to show that
the locality in which his expert practiced was substantially similar to
the locality in which the defendant practiced. Rejecting this view, the
appellate court commented, "The circumstances attendant to the instant
case did not justify restrictive imposition of the 'locality rule.' Moreover,
any reasons in logic and law which compel retention of this rule, in what-
ever form, were not present in this case." ' The net result is a heavy dis-
approval of the restrictive results of the locality rule. The wording of
the liberal locality rule"s implies the question: Just what is "similar"?
The Cook case answered the question: "[T]his court's awareness that
up-to-date medical facilities and techniques are at the disposal of almost
any modern city in this country, leads us to judicially notice that, insofar
as the practice of medicine is concerned, Miami is at least a community
Couch v. Hutchison, 135 So.2d 18, 23 (Fla. App. 1961). The court also approved critical
comments from Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 772 (1949); and 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 121 (1959).
63. Couch v. Hutchison, 135 So.2d 18, 23 (Fla. App. 1961).
64. 144 So.2d 312 (Fla. App. 1962).
65. The defendant doctor in the Cook case was actually a specialist, being an ortho-
pedic surgeon, and he was not a general practitioner. Evidence of a general practitioner
would be admissible on the standard of care expected of a specialist, any objections as to
the expertise of this kind of witness will go only to the weight to be given his evidence,
and not to its admissibility. Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).
"[Olne who holds himself out as a specialist must employ not merely the skill of a general
practitioner, but also that special degree of skill normally possessed by the average physi-
cian who devotes special study and attention to the particular organ or disease or injury
involved, having regard to the present state of scientific knowledge." Carbone v. Warburton,
22 N.J. Super. 5, 9, 91 A.2d 518, 520 (1952).
66. Query: Might not it be better, if the locality rule is to be retained at all, to reverse
this burden, and require a defendant to show, as part of his burden, that the tendered
expert is incompetent, due to lack of familiarity with conditions in the locality in which
the defendant practiced? This view would restrict the attack of the defendant to the
weight to be given to plaintiff's expert testimony, rather than to its admissibility. Thus
the exclusionary effect of the locality rule might be avoided.
67. Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So.2d 312, 316 (Fla. App. 1962).




similar to West Palm Beach."6 Thus, the question remaining for ulti-
mate examination is whether there is, or ought to be any true distinction
between the standards of medical care which can be obtained in any
community in the nation.
CAN THE SCHOOL AND LOCALITY RULES BE ELIMINATED?
The rationales for fixing liability upon a physician are:
(1) The express terms of the contract between the parties;
(2) Terms implied by law from the contract;
(3) Standards of care required by law, entirely apart from the
contract between the parties.
Early rationales of both the school and locality rules rested heavily
upon the contract between the parties.7" This view assumed that the
parties contemplated the standard of care to be exercised. The unreality
of this is apparent, when one questions whether in fact the patient actu-
ally understands"' and approves of the distinctions in theory between
the schools of osteopathy and of medicine, or whether the patient under-
stands that the small-town doctor knows less medicine or is more careless
than his large-city cousin. While it may be tidy to base the liability of
the physician upon the contract between the parties,72 it does not answer
the entire problem.
The second possible basis of fixing liability, the terms of the con-
tract implied by law, results in imposing the standard of reasonable care
upon the physician. 3 This is the view which initially generated the
school and locality rules, to aid in the definition of just what that reason-
able care"' under similar circumstances ought to be. The harsh results
engendered by too enthusiastic applications of those rules have, of neces-
sity, resulted in exceptions to both rules. These exceptions now seem
69. Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So.2d 312, 316 (Fla. App. 1962).
70. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 Atl. 1116 (1893); Bowman v. Woods, 1
Greene 441 (Iowa 1848); Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am. Dec. 593 (1862); Bryant
v. Biggs, 331 Mich. 64,49 N.W.2d 63 (1951).
71. Does the patient know that he is consulting an osteopath, and not a "regular"
doctor? Florida requires each practitioner of the healing arts to advertise his "school" on
his professional sign, and in lettering not less than two and one half inches high by one
inch wide. FLA. STAT. § 458.14 (1961).
72. Close analysis of the early cases upon which the contractual rationale of the
school rule is based, will disclose a strong reliance upon presumed actual consent by the
patient to being treited according to the standards of the physician's school. "A person
professing to follow one system of medical treatment, cannot be expected by his employer
to practice any other." Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene 441 (Iowa 1848). "A physician of
one ... school ...is to be tested by the general doctrines of his school, and not by
those of other schools. It is to be presumed that both parties so understand it." Patten v.
Wiggin, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am. Dec. 593 (1862).
73. Any person who holds himself out to diagnose or treat human disease is practicing
medicine. FLA. STAT. § 458. 13(1) (1961).
74. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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fully large enough to engulf the rule, and leave the standard of care to
be simply expressed as reasonable care under the circumstances.75
However, the third possible basis, that of fixing the duty of the doctor
by law, entirely apart from the contract between the parties, offers the
most promising standard regulating the care required.
The state has undertaken to regulate and license7 6 physicians, to
insure that anyone who holds himself out as competent to treat human
illnesses will have at least a minimal technical competency to so prac-
tice.77 If the law can require minimal standards of training, why can it
not impose additional requirements? Should it not require the physician
to keep abreast of the latest advances in medical science, by technical
manuals, post-graduate refresher training,7" or any other common media?
This requirement can be imposed simply by judicial elimination of the
judicially created school and locality rules. Indeed, the very wording
75. The physician's duty is "to use ordinary skill and diligence and to apply the means
and methods ordinarily and generally used by physicians of ordinary skill and learning in
the practice of his profession to determine the nature of the ailment and to act upon his
honest opinion and conclusion." Hill v. Boughton, 146 Fla. 505, 511, 1 So.2d 610, 613 (1941).
Accord, Edwards v. Uland, 193 Ind. 376, 140 N.E. 546 (1923); Clark v. George, 148 Minn.
52, 180 N.W. 1011 (1921).
76. First Florida licensing for physicians in 1889 (separate boards for practitioners of
medicine and homeopathy). See FLA. STAT. §§ 458, 459, 460 (1961).
77. See note 9 supra. When a person who is not licensed by the state to treat human
illnesses undertakes to do so, he will be required to live up to the standards of care estab-
lished by the licensed practitioners of the healing arts. Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass.
40, 158 N.E. 270 (1927); Epstein v. Hirschon, 33 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
78. Florida Statutes require practitioners of Osteopathy and Chiropractic to attend
annual refresher courses or their equivalent, as a prerequisite to renewal of licenses to
practice. No such requirement is made for practitioners of medicine. FTLA. STAT. §§ 459.19
(Osteopaths), 460.27 (Chiropractic) (1961).
The physician's refuge behind the locality rule is subject to attack on the basis of the
physician's duty to keep abreast of practices in other localities: "But the contention of [the
defendant] is archaic. It was not without merit in former days when distances were great
and the mode of travel was in keeping with muddy lanes, swollen streams and impassable
mountains; when the means of communication were restricted to handwritten letters;
when medical journals were rare and their contents were largely concerning personalities.
Today the discoveries of insulin, iron, quinine, strychnine or the antibiotics is [sic]
instantly heralded throughout the civilized world and as speedily communicated are the
methods of administering them and the symptoms for which they are to be applied.
Every great hospital in the land maintains systems for preserving statistical information
relative to the treatments of diseases and injuries, much of which is published to the
medical world in attractive journals, whereby practitioners are equipped immediately to
utilize the new remedies. The same is true with respect to all new methods and devices of
the surgical art. The ubiquity of such knowledge, the popularity of ethical standards in
every part of the nation and the uniformity of curricula in medical schools have combined
to create one community of medical practitioners out of the 48 states and the District of
Columbia. Surely, a surgeon in San Luis Obispo has acquired practically the same knowl-
edge of surgery that is practiced in both San Francisco and Los Angeles. [The defendant]
was educated in the same schools of medicine with [the plaintiff's expert] who has enjoyed
a contemporary practice in -California communities similar to San Luis Obispo. If a surgeon
in a coast town does not maintain the same ethical standards as do surgeons of the two
more populous cities, it is not because the standards .have not been established there, but
rather because of his lack of interest in his work, or he is negligent in -performance." Gist
v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 269, 288 P.2d 1003, 1017 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
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of the major exception to the school rule, "where the principles of the
schools do or should concur, 9 opens the door for the imposition of a
duty upon the practitioners of one school to keep abreast of, and adopt
advances made by the other schools. Entirely distinctly, and in addition
to the other duty, the physician can be held to a duty equivalent to that
of great care to call in a specialist in situations which he recognizes are
beyond his capacity."0 This would render a physician liable for his un-
reasonable failure to seek special aid in all situations of doubt, in order
that the patient, whose benefit and protection are the ultimate aims of
state regulation, may have the best possible care.
The medical profession has undertaken the burden of the Hip-
pocratic oath, "The regimen I adopt shall be for the benefit of my
patients according to my ability and judgment, and not for their hurt or
for any wrong." Can the law permit any less?
ELLIOT L. MILLER
79. Thus, a defendant doctor is held not only to the competent practice of the theorems
of his own school, but in addition he is charged with a duty "of keeping pace with the
progress of professional knowledge, ideas, and discoveries, to the extent that a faithful,
conscientious, and competent practitioner, of whatever school, may be reasonably expected
• .. to do . . . ." Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 171, 27 Atl. 1116, 1117 (1893); see
generally later cases collected in Annot., 78 A.L.R. 696 (1932).
80. This theory has been applied to situations other than the usual duty of a general
practitioner to call on a specialist in serious cases. It has been extended to a duty to cross
school lines in situations where the treatment of the school of the defendant would be
unable to aid the patient. "[I]t was incumbent on him to use reasonable care and skill
to ascertain whether the ailments were of the class to which his treatment applied. If not,
it was his duty to so advise plaintiff, in order that she might secure the services of one
familiar with such ailments." Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 189, 205 N.W. 159, 162
(1925).
